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I -- TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT: CONTEXT AND NEEDS
Substantial attention has been given to the needs of Congress for
more adequate technology assessment support. Alternative notions about
the specific functions and organizational arrangement to supply this
support have also been given systematic consideration. The purpose of
this paper is to examine briefly, through the means of a hypothetical
assessment structure, certain operational implications of a Congressional
Assessment Component.
Many of the controlling or influential conditions are readily
apparent. Technology assessment is a vast and pervasive function engaged
in by a multiplicity of participants in both the public and private
sectors. Assessing entities differ as Ito objectives, resources,
capabilities, practices, and outputs. Such entities are usually concerned
with some special aspect of the overall Policy Analysis, Project Planning,
Program Implementation, Regulation, or Monitoring-Evaluation process.
Some assessment entities deal with numerous technologies; others deal
r	 with only one application of a given technology; perhaps most are
concerned with a narrow, specialized dimension of a givei,^ application.
Few entities in our assessment structure deal with the full spectrum of
social impacts of a given technological application. Even when the
outputs of all existing entities in some way associated with the assessment
of a particular application are combined, we cannot assume that a total
assessment of all the significant social impacts have been identified
i
t
and evaluated In short, our assessment function is highly fragmented.
1	 ,
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A deficiency exists in our information management capability for assuring
adequate total impact assessments or for providing; the continuity of
assessment data which will identify those social impacts which need to
be given attention in specific assessments. Our present assessment
organization and procedures do not assure that the outputs of the
multiple assessment entities constituting the assessment system for
any given technological application will interact in the normal course
of events (or will be consciously integrated at given intervals) so as
to effectively combine assessment outputs. Assuming that such integra-
tion does periodically occur, one must still ask whether the outcome
constitutes a total impact assessment of the given application. It
would seem to be fairly well agreed that the Congressional Committee
Hearing-Forum has not always been an adequate mechanism for integrating
the relevant information into an understandable, cohesive whole.
A further factor to be noted is that numerous assessments are
made by entities other than Congress which, for all practical purposes,
are final. Through statutory authorization various Boards and
Administrations within the Executive Branch are the loci for such
assessments as are those regulatory agencies which deal with technological
problems. In many instances, as with the Foc,d and Drug Administration
and the Atomic Energy Commission, a highly institutionalized assessment i
system for relevant applications has been developed. Where such
regularized assessment systems are performing, adequately, there would
seem to be little need for Congressional concern other than with periodic
oversight to assure continued satisfactory performance. In many areas
3of technological, development serious deficiencies do exist, however,
which would seem to require more intensive Congressional attention, at
least to the extent of assuring the establishment of assessment pro-
cedures which will provide adequate assessments,, total impact or otherwise,
as needed.
The great variety of assessment demands and assessment tasks in
conjunction with the diversity of assessment, entities, make it difficult
to grasp the scope of the assessment function which should be undertaken
by a reinforced Legislative assessment component. Put quantitatively,
what professional capability and supporting ;resources are required
through what period of time to adequately perform a specified assessment
task? Numerous variables are involved in our assessment practices:
The character of the technology to be assessed
The particular application to be assessed and the
specific operational context in which such application
is located
• The objective of the assessment: feasibility, costs,
prospective social uses, possible social harms, need
for further research, need for safety precautions in
use, need for continuing regulation, etc.
• Limitations on resources for the assessment (time and
professional talent)
• The social indicator/evaluation scheme or schemes to
be employed in such evaluation
The possibility of finding precise equivalencies between the given
assessment task and the time, facilities, and professional manpower
required is not encouraging. Often resource constraints define the scope
of the task whatever the ideal magnitude of support might be. Arbitrary-
constraints on time and professional support are imposed out of simple
4t
necessity to define the scope of the task and to assure its execution.
One need only mention the following recent assessments in order to gain
some notion of the variety of arrangements (including subject matter,
objectives, and organizational structures) involved in the assessment
function:
A. Executive Branch:
1. Noise - Sound without Value. Federal Council for Science and
Technology Committee on Environmental Quality), September
1968.
2. Considerations Affectir Steam Power Plant Site Selection.
Office of Science	 Technology (Energy Policy Staff), 1968.
	
3`. Environmental Impact of the B 	 s Swamp Jetport. U.S.
	
artment of Interior, Sep	 er, 1969.
4. Potential Mechanization in the Flue-Cured Tobacco Industr
with Emphasis on Human Resource Adjustment. Department of
Agriculture (Economic Research Service), September, 1969.
5. The Automobile and Air Pollution:  A Program for Pro_ gress.
Department of Commerce(Commerce Technical Advisory Board;,
Panel on Electrically Powered Vehicles), October, 1967.
6. Tomorrow's Transportation: New Systems for the Urban Future.
Department of H ing and Urban Development (Office of
Metropolitan Development-, Urban Transportation Adminis-
tration), 1968.
B. Legislative Branch
7 The Search for a Low-Emission Vehicle. U.S. Senate, Committee
on Commerce (Staff Report), 91st Congress, 1st Session, 1969.
8. Administration of Protect Mohole^by the National Science
Foundation. A Report to the Congress by the U.S. Comptroller
General, April 23, 1968,
SC. NationalAct of Sciences, National Academy of Engineering
National. Research Council:
9. Useful Applications of Earth-Oriented Satellites. Summer
Study on Space Applications, Division of Engineering,
National Research Council, HAS-NAE, 1969.
10. Drug Efficacy Study. A Report to the Commissioner of Food
and Drugs from the Division of Medical Sciences, National
Research Council, NAS-NAE, 1969.
11. Environmental Problems in South Florida. A Preliminary Report.
of the Environmental Study Group to the Environmental Studies
Board, NAS-NAE, September 16, 1969.
Our preliminary probes into the technology assessment process by
the Program of Policy Studies at GVOJ strongly indicate that to this
point we have hardly made an impression on such conceptual challenges
as that of defining an Adequate Assessment or on the analytical task
of relating the adequate assessment of a given application to the
level of resources required. This is said with full recognition that
the studies initiated by the House Committee on Science and Astronautics
(the Technology Assessment Reports b y the National Academy of Sciences
and the National Academy of Engineering and the Report on Technical
Information For Congress by the Legislative Reference Service) 1 have
1
Technology: Processes of Assessment and Choice, Report of the
National Academy of Sciences to the Committee on Science and Astronautics,
U.S. House of Representatives, July 1969. A Study of Technology
Assessment, Report of the Committee on Public Engineering Policy, National
Academy of Engineering, to the Committee on Science and Astronautics,
U.S. House of Representatives, July 1969. Technical Information for
Congress, Report of the Science Policy Research Division of the Legis-
lative Reference Service, Library of Congress, to the Subcommittee on
Science, Research and Development of the Committee on Science and
Astronautics, U.S. House of Representatives, April 1969.
r
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greatly advanced our thinking on these and other critical assessment
questions.
My comments will be directed to the following topics: 1) The
positing of a hypothetical Technology Assessment Component for legis-
lative support; 2) The posing of a number of questions relating to the
operational context of this assessment component,including the Organi-
zational/Operational Framework, General Operational, Problems, Access
to Relevant Information, and the Utili&
Analyses; and 3) Some selected comments
While the content of these remarks
potential operational difficulties of a
component, it should be understood that
a negative attitude toward the need for
3tion of Assessment Data and
relevant to the questions posed.
is cautionary with respect to
legislative assessment support
such comments do not reflect
an improved technology assessment
structure. To the contrary, the purpose is to advance son e questions
which are likely to arise with the operations of a new assessment
component, however general may be the support for its proposed functions.
That substantial reasons lend support to the need for a better structured
technology assessment function seems clear, That some observers
question whether such an arrangement will make an appreciable improvement
in the performance of this function is,_ however, a point not to be
lightly dismissed. Further, existing entities may be concerned over a
loss of status or of function as a result of the implementation of any
new effort to more adequately assess the social benefits and costs of
advancing technology.
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TI - CONGRESSIONAL TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT COMPONENT:
A HYPOTHETICAL STRUCTURE
The intensification of professional attention to the technology
assessment; function over the past few years would seem to be based on
three primary assumptions: 1) That advancing science and technology
should be applied in a better informed and more deliberate manner so
as to maximize social benefits and minimize social costs; and 2) That
the technology assessment function can be more adequately performed
than is now the case with a resulting net gain in the social benefit/
cost ratio of technological applications; and 3) That the Congress
Needs an independent technology assessment capability of its own.
Hence, we need to know which technology assessment systems are performing
adequately and why,and which technology assessment systems are not working
well and why. Several deficiencies are apparent to those who have given
attention to this problem, as for example, the lack of coordination
among relevant assessment mechanisms for particular applications and the
inability, for this and other reasons, to perform total impact assessments
of such applications. With an understanding of the more serious
deficiencies, it is feasible to move to the question of what can be done
to improve the adequacy of the assessment function-. This basic question
can be reduced further to inquiries relating to the conceptual, organi-
zational, and operational aspects of a new mechanism or arrangement for
achieving an improved assessment function.
It is evident that the range of organizational alternatives which




ment data to they Congress is extremely broad. Certain suggestions have
been made by the recent reports on Technology Assessment of the National
Academy of Sciences and the National Academy of Engineering and 'b;? ^.-ae
Legislative Reference Service of the Library of Congress on Technical
Information `For C_ gress. It might also be noted that many other
suggestions have been made by Committees of the Congress as well as by
individuals. Eilene Galloway discusses the topic of Scientific Advice
for Congress in "An Analysis of Three Proposals" which is included in
the book Knowledge and Power, edited by Sanford A. Lakoff ( `1966). All
such proposals have certain recognizable disadvantages as well as
advantages. All leave considerable areas of uncertainty as to how useful
such mechanisms would prove to be in actual operation. No doubt, any
additional alternatives will have similar_ (Yharacteristics. The task,
however, is to examine as thoroughly as possible beforehand the means
of maximizing the adequacy of the assessment function while minimizing
insofar as practicable, the legal, jurisdictional, and other operational
difficulties.
In recognition of the reluctance to establish new agencies out of
fear of simply adding further bureaucratic impedance to the governmental
assessment circuit some observers no doubt feel that the sensible approach
is to locate any additional assessment capability in an existing
i9
Technology assessments on a broad range of subjects are
feasible and can be expected to be useful to the decision
making processes of the Congress, when prepared by properly
constituted, Independent, ad hoc task forces with adequate
staff support and time. (p.3).
A management organization, controlled by and answering
to the Congress, should arrange for the preparation of
technology assessments for Congressional purposes. No
single, permanent organization can be envisioned that
could provide adequate in-house expertise to execute
assessments ` in all of the fields that may be required
by Congress. Therefore it would be useful to contract
for or Ito administer and organize the assessment task
forces. (p.4).
The NAS Report gives attention to several organizational alternatives.
It was agreed among this panel that there should be important assessment
components in both the Legislative and Executive Branches. With refer-
ence to the Congress, one alternative considered was that of a Joint
Congressional Committee on Technology Assessment supported by a highly
qualified staff. Another separate alternative was that of a Technology
Assessment Office serving the Congress as a whole. The NAS Report states
that: "The panel is not prepared to recommend a choice between a
Congress-wide unit and a joint committee." (p.106).
In view of the fact-that-possibilities for a new assessment arrange-
ment are almost unlimited and that subsequent operational characteristics
would depend to a substantial extent upon the particular arrangement
selected, tt is felt useful to posit a hypothetical Congressional i
Technology Assessment Component for purposes of this. discussion. The'
arrangement here posited is not necessarily offered as the most
desirable among the various alternatives. It has been selected for two
primary,  reasons: 1) The basic structure is easily grasped; and 2) The
interrelationships which would be involved in the operations of such a
Aw 1;
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component raise a rather broad range of questions whinb..probably merit
consideration preparatory to the design of a new mechanism.
In the barest, skeletal form the Assessment Component posited
.-
consist of two elements:
1. An Office of Technology Assessment which will perform a
variety of assessment tasks in support of Congressional
decision making.
2. A Joint Select Committee on Technology and Society which
will focus attention on the general problem of the
application of technological resources to social needs as
well as perform consulting, advising, and oversight functions
in connection with the operations of the Office of Technology
Assessment.
A more detailed exposition of the concept, functions, and organizational
aspects of the Congressional Assessment Component are as follows
Assumption:
That the Congress is in need of improved_informational
and analytical support on legislative matters involving
substantial scientific or technological components.
An assessment arrangement with the below noted characteristics
is posited for analytical purposes, i.e., the legal/political
Implications which may arise from the operations of a Technology
Assessment Component.
Concept and Functions
A Congressional entity which can perform the fdnction of
assembling and analyzing data relevant to an overall
evaluation of the effectiveness of the process of applying
technological resources to National social goals.
An assessment service which can assure the Congress and its
Committees that the full range of social impacts have (or
have not) been identified and the magnitude, intensity and
persistency of such effects measured re significant technological	 {








evaluations of the social desirability or undesirability of
such impacts in accord with an explicit scheme or schemes
of social indicators.
An assessment service which performs primarily an "inte-
grationist" function, making maximum use of the assessment
data from various existing technology assessment systems so
as to provide Total Impact Assessment data to the Congress
with the greatest effectiveness and economy.
An assessment service which can evaluate for the Congress
the adequacy of assessment systems for existing or pros-
pective applications, identifying deficiencies In existing
"regularized' or "institutionalized" assessment systems and
recommending means for correcting such deficiencies. (For
example,, the lack of reliable data on certain obvious
social impacts or the failure to provide a forum for all
affected segments of the public to advance claims or com-
plaints re technological applications).
An assessment service which can provide the Congress with
initial assessments on new or prospective applications if
no regularized assessment system exists for such task and
such assessment is not forthcoming from other reliable
sources.
An. assessment service which can advise relevant Committees
of the Congress (when requested) information on segments
of the public which should be represented by witnesses in
the ultimate assessment forum (Congressional hearing).
An assessment service which can provide for an information
service by which assessment information can be accumulated
in an orderly, current, and usable fashion.
a
Organization: (Prescribe by Statute)
1. Set out declaration of Congressional Policy (Concept
and Functions as noted above).
2. Establish an Office of Technology Assessment (OTT-)
to carry out the desired functions.
3. Provide for a Director of the Office to be appointed




k. Provide for the Director to obtain from all Depart-
ments and Agencies of the Federal Government
pertinent assessment information on technological
applications (primarily non-defense) which the OTA
may from time to time require in the performance of
its responsibilities (with exceptions minimized
and noted).
5. Provide contractual authority for the OTA with respect
to Project Research Support.
6. Provide for joint consultation with the National Science
Foundation on Institutional Grant Support to Universities,
National Laboratories, Policy Analysis Groups and similar
Organizations which can provide continuing developmental
support in specialized areas of technology assessment.
7. Provide for a Joint Select Committee on Technology and
Society which will perform the following functions;
a. Keep fully and currently informed on the status
and prospects for the application of technolog-
ical resources to national social goals.
b. Provide a forum for the evaluation of the overall
impact of technological applications on the full
spectrum of social needs.
c. Encourage the use of analytical approaches and
information management techniques in the assess-
ment of technological applications which will
support an overall system of social accounting.
d. Consult and advise with the Director of the
Office of Technology Assessment on the policies,
objectives, tasks, and assessment prartices of
the Office.
e. Review periodically the performance of the Office
of Technology Assessment.
f. Recommend to the Committees on Government Operations
the annual budgetary support for e the Office of
Technology Assessment, including joint programs with
other offices or agencies.
8• Maintain the closest practicable liasion with the
Executive Office of the President and agencies of
the Executive Branch responsible for the application
of technological resources to social needs.
r
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One point merits attention before proceeding to more specific
questions. While this assessment arrangement is not posited as a
model to be advocated to the exclusion of others but rather as an
analytical reference, there is one conceptual thrust to this arrange-
ment which justifies brief elaboration and strong emphasis. The
rationale underlying the Joint Select Committee on Technology and Society
is not that it serve merely as a link between the Congress and the
Office of Technology Assessment, undertaking Congressional coordinating
functions re public issues involving significant technological components
processing requests from various Committees directed to the OTA, per-
forming as a consulting and oversight Committee for the OTA, and
providing a mechanism for facilitating the OTA's information exchanges
with other governmental agencies and pivate sector entities. The JSC
would have a broader responsibility than technology assessment in the
sense of ;identifying the impacts of given applications and evaluating
the social benefit/cost ratio of such applications. This type of
analytical task would be the province of OTA. The Joint Select Committee-	 I
t	 would assume the responsibility of keeping fully and currently informed
on the total national potential for the application of technological
resources to social needs. Technology assessment-is only one aspect,
however important, to this more general function. The outcome of a
total impact assessment of a prospective technological_ application under
specified conditions is,. of course, essential in determining whether
and how such technology is to be applied. However, this analytical
task is, or should be with new technologies, only one significant phase
I1.4
in the process of getting the technology applip-4 if it does have real
potential for eliminating certain social harms or for contributing to
various social objectives. Put another way; the mere positing of a
technology against relevant social needs is only a beginning of the
process of moving such technology into an operational program. The
process of technology application is a social/political action process,
not just an analytical task which involves the recognition of the
interaction of such elements as:
Participants in the relevant socio/political context in
which the application is to be applied
. The Perspective and Resources of such Participants
Influential Contextual Conditions and Trends
• Situations of Assessment (Forums) and/or Decision (Arenas)
• Alternative Strategies employed by Participants
• Alternative Outcomes of Assessment Forums or Decisional
Arenas
• Probable Social Impacts of such Outcomes
It is not suggested that the-JSC have any direct legislative authority
with respect to the actual process of getting socially useful, available.,
and prospective technologies applied. It is suggested that it perform
an informational integrating function and provide a forum whereby an
approximate accounting can be continuously conducted on the effectiveness
w
with which our technological resources are being applied to social goals
(for example, how our nationallaboratories, scientific institutes and
associations, the universities, R&D firms, and so forth, can best





A compelling reason for this suggestion is that a positive thrust
should be given to scientific and technological, enterprise which repre-
sents one of our great national resources. The assumption of a
responsibility to review and appraise the effectiveness with which we
are applying such resources to pressing national social needs would
fill a neglected policy function. Further, it would serve as a counter-
balance to any tendency to become negatively oriented in the technology
assessment function, i.e., to emphasize detriments to the neglect of





III - OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
RESPONSIBILITIES, POWERS, AND .OPERATIONSy
The following questions are focused upon the operations of the
hypothetical Office of Technology Assessment although the relationships
necessarily involve the posited Joint Select Committee on Technology
and Society, other Committees of the Congress, the Legislative Reference
Service, the General Accounting Office, the Executive Office of the
President, various Departments and Agencies in the Executive Branch,
the Regulatory Agencies, and private sector entities.
A. Organizational/Operational Framework
1. Assuming the Technology Assessment Component posited,
should the statutory scheme provide explicitly that
the final authority for setting the assessment tasks
of the OTA are to be with the Director of the OTA?
Should such authority be qualified by requiring con-
sultation with the JSC on Technology and Society at
stated intervals, i.e., annually, semi-annually?
Since the JSC would be representative of the entire
Congress, how might the process of agenda formulation
be organized?
2. What critieria of priority should be employed in selecting
assessment tasks?
3. Would the acceptance of the foregoing method (A.I.) of
"setting the agenda" necessarily preclude response to
assessment requests from other sources? Individual
Congressmen? All Congressional Committees having juris-
diction over social problems areas or governmental
activities involving significant scientific or techno-
logical components? The President (BOB, OST, etc.)?
Executive Agencies, Programs, or Administrations?
4. Should the OTA be directed by statute to maintain a
continuing information interaction with the OST/BOB in
order to coordinate assessment efforts and maximize the
productiveness of assessment activities in both the 	 j
Executive and Legislative Branches? if so, how might this
be accomplished?
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5. Will the OTA be expected to coordinate only with OST /BOB
on to maintain continuing assessment information arrange-
ments with all executive and regulatory agencies as well
as private sector entities as a.means of assuring the
optimum, use of assessment capabilities?
6. Should provision be made for "public hearings" by the GTA?
Under what circumstances might such hearings be required?
For what purposes should the OTA otherwise initiate hear-
ings? Under what conditions might hearings be intitated
""on petition" and by what "interested parties"? If formal
hearing authority should be provided, under what circum-
stances would witnesses be placed under oath? If d
witness is compelled to testify, would he have the right
to counsel,? Should counsel be privleged to cross-examine
witnesses giving evidence contrary,to his client? Would
testimony or communications from witnesses or correspondents
with the OTA be privileged? As an alternative to OTA
hearings, might the public hearing function be conducted
only by the Joint Select. Committee on Technology and Society?
7. In order to maintain the "independence" and "integrity" of
the assessment function, what proscriptions, if any, should
the Congress place on the Director and Staff of the OTA with
respect to associations and relationships with other assess-
ment. entities or interested participants?
S. Will reports of the OTA have any special legal standing in
civil or criminal cases against government officials or
private companies responsible for the application of
technologies which have resulted in alleged harm to a com-
plainant? Will the director or members of the OTA be
subject to subpoena as witnesses in such cases?
s
B. General Operational Problems
1. To what extent might a skeptical attitude toward the social
utility of a Congressional Assessment Component hinder the
operations of OTA?
2. To what extent might the critical/cautious attitude arising
from jurisdictional conflicts or additional administrative
inconvenience hinder the operations of OTA?
3. What "image" should the OTA attempt to cultivate? While
the basic thrust may be toward the establishment of a non-
partisan, non-political entity of recognized capability
and competence, in what respects must the OTA inevitably
assume a "'partisan" stance? Will it be Lin "active'" or
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"passive'" ombudsman? What type of role should it play and.
what "reputation," should it seek, in order to maximize its
usefulness in the legislative process?
4. What would be the likely implications should the OTA assess
not merely technological applications per se (assuming com-
petent and responsible administration and management) but
the quality of the management of the application as well?
5. What general guidelines should be provided, and by whom,
for the division of responsibility for technology assessment
among OTA, the Science Policy Research Division of the
Legislative Reference Service of the Library of Congress,
the General Accounting Office, and particular Committees
of the Congress, if any, which may wish to provide or
continue with their separate assessment functions?
6. How might the OTA provide for the accommodation of ad hoc,
special, "non-programmed" assessment activities? Even
should the Director of OTA attempt to minimize the ad hoc
obligations of the Office, how could he respond in a
practical sense re;
Permitting OTA staff to appear as witnesses
before Congressional Committees on specific
bills?
. Providing special reports on specific bills?
• Making temporary assignments of OTA Staff
Members to Committees?
• Making temporary assignments of OTA Staff
Members to Executive Agencies?
7. What type or types of Assessment Data Systems should be irritated
and maintained by the OTA? Will the OTA, in general, tend to
apply its resources to the task of closing deficiencies iu
existing institutionalized assessment data systems and in
designing and intitating new data systems for prospective
technological applications?
C. Access to Relevant Information
1. What will be the scope of the responsibility of the OTA for
technology assessment? Will it have defined areas for inquiry
or will it be given the broadest type of charter for inquiring
into every facet of technological applications (existing and
prospective) on a Total Impact Assessment basis that is,
I
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Looking at all the social interactions of a given application?
This is a basic question having implications for subsequent
questions.
2. Will the OTA be provided, with formal authority (similar to
the GAO) which is essentially co-extensive with its
responsibilities or might the compulsory authority of the
OTA be deliberately minimized in order to encourage 	 the
development of mutually beneficial information exchange
relationships?
	
In other words, will the strategy be to
persuade, appealing to the net gains from the technology
assessment function, rather than to compel?
3. What should be the nature of the authority granted the OTA
by Congress so as to facilitate its access to relevant
information in the Executive Branch?	 In the Regulatory
Agencies?
4. What would be the nature of the formal authority conferred
on the OTA by the Congress so as to facilitate its access
to essential data in the private sector:	 competitive
information, private/personal information such as hospital
or nursing home records, etc.?
5. What would be the position of the OTA if, subsequent to the
establishment of the OTA, one or more of the Committees of
the Congress now having oversight responsibilities for a
given technological area refused to cooperate and directed
the relevant Regulatory Agency and the regulated industry
entities not to cooperate (re providing relevant assessment
data) with the OTA?
6. What if the Secretary of an Executive Department should take
a similar position and the President, while refusing to
permit the exercise of Executive Privilege in the situation,
remained indifferent?
7. Assuming that in some limited circumstances the OTA should
have the subpoena power or should have access to information
through the direct subpoena power of Congress, what guidelines
should be provided which would define such limited and
justifiable circumstances so as to withstand legal challenge?
8. Should the OTA have to resort to BOB "clearance" of its
information surveys with private sector entities?
	
Should
the OTA have to resort to information filed with other govern-




9. What will be the procedures and criteria employed for
"contracting out" special assessment studies or other
tasks? To what extent might it be. required to do such
contracting out on a competitive basis? Will contracting
out (especially if the OTA should undertake to utilize
a large number and variety of contractors) tend to
aggravate the information assess problems with the Executive
Agencies and private sector entities (imposing upon such
Agencies and entities an increasingly greater burden in
terms of informational requirements)? What might be done
with respect to selecting topics and contractors to minimize
this burden?
10. What should be theprocedure and criteria for selecting
organizations or institutions which might qualify for
continuing "institutional grants" to carry on segments of
an overall "systems approach' to technology assessment?
11. What role will "experts" or advisory committees have in OTA
operations?
12. How can the OTA handle various types of "conflict of interest"
problems which might not arise as a legal issue but for
reasons that full and candid information from a uniquely
qualified individual would place him in a different position
re his relationship with his associated organization or
institution? Would the OTA activity bring up any new "con-
flict of interest" questions? What would likely be the
attitude of the OTA re well informed people who are acting as
regular consultants to various mission-oriented Government
agencies?
13. Would any unique problems arise re the collection and
retention of certain types of information under "for offi-
cial use only" categories? Would problems be different from
those which arise with the Census or with the Regulatory
Agencies which do maintain the confidentiality of financial
statements of the industrial groups regulated?'
D. Utilization of "ads sment 'Data 'And 'Analyses
1. If the OTA is to be primarily an assessment support activity
for the Congress, will it nevertheless be assumed to be
generally accountable to the Public? If some segment or
participant in the "public" is dissatisfied with OTA perfor-
21.
2. Which Committees will regularly receive the reports and
statements of the OTM Which Committees will receive
particular reports and on what basis? Which entities
of the Executive Branch? What private sector entities?
3. What will be the responsibilities of the OTA to inform
relevant Committees of the Congress with respect to the
Optimum Social System (effects and interactions) which
should be examined when specific bills come before such
Committees? This matter has special relevance to pro-
posals involving continuing technological developments
for which many ck' the relevant impacts have already been
given attention in previous assessments?
4. Are there any types of assessment reports which will not
be generally available to the Congress, the Executive
Agencies, or to any segment of the public? Will the OTA
direct its activities only to "non-security" problems?
Will some reports be limited in distribution if "classified"
material has been used but the report itself is not
classified?
5. Who will be able to complain to whom in what forum and under
what circumstances if the OTA undertakes to disseminate
assessment data that may be considered by the complainant
to affect national security or to involve private competitive
information (trade secrets, etc.)?
6. Who will be able to complain to whom in what forum and under
what circumstances if the petitioner asserts that relevant
information (not necessarily his own) has not been taken into
account in an OTA report that has been or is planned for
general dissemination or to a Committee of the Congress?
7. While an OTA would not take any direct action to follow up its
assessments where a recommendation is made explicitly or
implicitly which is harmful or is allegedly harmful to the
present or future activities of a private entty,.might the
OTA nevertheless be compelled (pressured) in some instances to
hold rebuttal hearings for such projects?
8. What might be the possibility of instances arising in which
advance notice of an assessment report (having substantial
detrimental implications for a private entity or entities)
would motivate the initiation of a suit for injunction to
bar the release of publication of such report? How could
such a suit be instituted?
..	 V.
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9. Various problems of governmental immunity are herein suggested.
What might be the liability of the OTA Director or Members
of the Staff for people who have relied upon the safety of an
application explicitly found beneficial by the OTA but which
turns out to have serious adverse effects? Is there any pre-
cedent for personal or governmental liability of an analysis/
advisory group such as OTA which has brought harm upon a




IV - SELECTED COMMENTS: ASSESSMENT PERFORMANCE CRITERIA
It is evident that the foregoing questions do not slide into
precise, discrete slots as might bey indicated by the grouping used.
In a sense they are all interrelated. It is therefore useless to
ponder long over the proper sequence. Yet it is imperative to be
concerned about certain fundamental considerations: Just what assess-
ment functions are required to satisfy the legislative needs of the
Congress? Assuming a basic organizational structure, how can such
Component be employed to most effectively perform these functions?
If one is inclined to feel that resistance to the performance of these
functions will be serious and persistent then the Component should be
armed with sufficient formal authority to assure access to relevant
information. If, on the other hand, one is disposed to believe that
the effectiveness of the operation depends almost entirely on the
promise of mutual benefit for the various assessing entities then the
strategy would be directed toward the cultivation of cooperative, non
r	 abrasive relationships with coercive tactics reduced to a minimum. In
short, the scope of assessment responsibility provided or assumed, the
formal compulsory authority with which the OTA is provided, and the
manner of implementing the assessment function are all closely inter-
twined with the "image" of OTA which will evolve.
The desire to be appreciated,.even admired, may not be wholly
consistent with the tasks which must be performed. Is it wise, there	 1
fore, to assume that the success of the Congressional Assessment
Component will _depend largely upon the disposition of the OTA to
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cultivate cooperative attitudes among relevant assessment entities?
Might a "hard line" assumption be just as plausible? Or should the
statutory scheme provide the broadest assessment responsibility with
back up formal authority in the event certain intractable situations
develop, in other words, provide the widest range of options in
operational procedure? Rather than wallow in the "image" question and
the general operational policy to be pursued, it is probably more
profitable to think of essentials and examine how certain of the questions
posed might relate to characteristics such as:
• Capability of the OTA to perform assessments as compre-
hensive and in as much depth as Congress may desire with
respect to a given technological application ep r se or in
the context of a given social problem.
• Ability of `the OTA to select assessment tasks and arrange,
with the assistance of the JSC, for the allocation of	 -
assessment tasks among the LRS, GAO, Executive Agencies,
and private sector entities so as to most expeditiously and
economically perform the.desired Congressional assessment
support role..
• Provision for access to the essential information sources
for the assessments desired.
• Provision for full representation of affected participants in
the assessment process
Capability of the OTA to manage the intricate informational
networks which are indispensable for the assembly of that
data upon which adequate assessments for Congressional
purposes can be made.
Provision for sufficient detachment of the OTA from the
political decision making process to assure independence of
analysis.
Provision for the linkage from OTA to the politicalprocess









Provision for continuity of the assessment function
Provision for continuing encouragement of the " professionali-
zation" of the assessment function
It would seem adv;'Lsable to restrict consideration of the, questions
posed in III above to a brief comment on the interrelationship of such
questions to the following Assessment Performance Criteria:
• Defining and Limiting the Assessment Tasks of
the OTA
• Noti:;n of "Independence" of the Assessment Function
• Representation of Affected Participants in the
Assessment Process
Discussion of the first criterion relates to such questions as:
A2, A3 9 A4 9 A5
B4 9 B5 9 B7.
Cl, C3, C$.
Discussion of the second criterion relates to such questions as:




Discussion of the third criterion relates to such questions as
I
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of the Executive Department. , Congress needs continuous updating on
prospective technological applications and their full, social impacts.
This Subcommittee itself has expressed such needs in part, but
emphatically, in its Report on "Managing the Environment" wherein it
was stated:
Regardless of improvements in Executive Branch
Organizations, the Congress needs an independent
and comprehensive source of information and advice...
(p.36)
Congress (has) a unique responsibility in obtaining
objective and complete information on technological.
consequences... (p.2)
The intent of Congress...is to avoid arbitrary
regulation and to establish a fact-based, rational
decision-making process which integrates all the
needs of society... (p.6)
The best means of gaining long-term rational
management is to generate an informational base
and provide a policy to all operational programs
which will cause individual decision makers to
act in harmony with the entire system... (p.29)
and f tnally:
The Congress should'proceed to develop an independent
capability for assessing the impact of technology on
the environment. (p.g)
It is apparent that the Congress needs Special Purpose Assessments
of various technological applications related to environmental manage-
ment and similar support for other social problem areas as well; it
also need Total Impact Assessments which examine the full social
2
Report of the Subcommittee on Science, Research and Development	 {
to the House Committee on Science and Astronautics of June-17, 1968.
1
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consequences of given technological applications. These two assessment
approaches are interrelated. But whatever technologies are selected
for total impact assessments and whatever social problem areas are,
selected for the investigation of technological applications as the
cause or cure of such problems, there are other types of assessement
activities which must be given attention. The JSC and the OTA would
need a firm grasp on the existing technology assessment structure, the
major social problem areas, technological resources which are available
for the advancement of social goals, technologies which are contributing
to social problems, technologies which are available for abating or
controlling social problems, and ways in which the assessment function
can most adequately be performed. If the OTA wished to be comprehensive	 r .
and systematic about this preliminary appraisal, it might proceed with
some approximation to the following:
1. Systematic grouping of major technologies.
2. Systematic organization of social goals, needs or
problem areas.
3. Matching technologies to relevant or potentially
relevant social needs so as to facilitate the
identification of existing and prospective tech-
nological applications.
4. Examination of the existing Technology Assessment
Structure in order to determine:
a. Which of the existing (or potential)
technological, applications has a regular-
ized (and adequate) technology assessment
system?
b. Which of the existing (or potential)
technological applications do not have
an adequate technology assessment system?
i
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(Not capable of producing a total impact
assessment or an optimum social sub-system
for assessment with respect to a particular
problem or issue)
c. Which technological applications have a
potentially adequate technology assessment
system with the need being only to make
adjustments in assessing entities or in
the assessment process to bring them up to
an adequate level of performance?
d. Which technological applications represent
both the level of effort and the character-
istics of uniqueness which requires special
treatment/assessment either by the new OTA
structure or by special ad hoc assessment
groups, boards, or commissions`
From this analysis the JSC/OTA will be in position to determine more
accurately the level of effort- required, the type of support needed,
and the more promising internal and external organizational arrange-
ments which should be developed.
This initial appraisal would provide an assessment information
base which would show all of the assessing entities constituting the
assessment system for major technological applications and for major
social problem areas with appropriate cross-referencing. Since we
cannot foresee all the possibilities under which social conditions will
interact with particular technological applications, it would seem all
the more essential to develop this comprehensive assessment information
system so as to provide maximum sensitivity for detecting both oppor-
tunities for the application of technological resources to social needs
and early warning signals of impending detrimental impacts
Raving taken this approach, we are immediately beset with a further
critical question: How can the JSCIOTA Component be utilized so as best
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to achieve Congressional aims with the most economical, and proficient
use of resources? One point upon which all tend to agree is that a
new assessment component should reinforce and refine the assessment
function rather than attempt to duplicate existing activities. But
how can this notion bereduced to organizational and operational terms?
While the OTA might be given the broadest assessment responsibility
and commensurate formal authority to assure the execution of assessment
functions, it should 'restrict its tasks to those which need to be
performed but which are not now being performed. It should a,so develop
procedures for assuring that all existing technology assessment systems
are operating in an adequate manner.
A few illustrations should suffice to demonstrate how the assessment
burdens of OTA can be limited to the essentials Certain points have
already been suggested. With respect to existing applications where a
regularized assessment system now exists with the capability of per-
forming adequately, the OTA would have no more than a monitoring and
information integration function to assure that suitable assessment
data is provided the Congress. The OTA should constantly strive to
x
develop Goordination within those highly Fragmented assessment systems
which provide no focal point for the integration of the total span of
social impacts so as to regularize the system for performing adequate
assessments. In short, the OTA should encourage, by whatever means
are available, performance of assessment tasks by other entities actually
or potentially capable of doing so. The OTA should take a strong
anticipatory orientation toward technology and obtain, through study con-
tracts or grants, comprehensive assessments of such technologies,
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especially in cases where developing partisan interests may sub-
sequently preclude access to relevant data or deliberately distort the
issues involved. The OTA. should also develop a scheme of priorities
of assessment tasks which will assist in assuring that the more signi-
ficant or critical matters are given attention. Both the NAS and NAE
Reports on Technology Assessment attempt to provide some guidance in
this connection. It is also evident from the previous discussion that
assessment tasks should be located primarily in those entities best
equipped to perform them. The development of such operational policies
by the OTA should make its assessment responsibility more manageable.
Certain implications follow the foregoing approach. Consider, for
example, that the Legislative Reference Service performs a particularly
useful job for the Congress. More specifically, the Science Policy
Research Division produced an excellent study on Technical Information
for Congress The list of technology assessment projects now in
progress, as 'outlined by Mr. Jayson in these hearings on November 24
1969, is certainly impressive. 3 It is also to be rooted that the
research staff assists the Committees of Congress in identifying wit-
nesses, preparing reports, and serving as consultants to the Committees.
As was indicated by Mr. Jayson, however, the management and monitoring
of a technology assessment function as he envisages the emerging need
"will require a substantial commitment of funds" in order to support a
vastly enlarged assessment.,, ea!pability. In sum it would seem that an
i
3	 t.
Testimony of Lester S. Jayson, Director, Legislative Reference
Service, Library of Congress, before the Subcommittee on Science,
Research and Development, Committee of Science and Astronautics, U.S.
House of Representatives, November 24, 1969.
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Office of Technology Assessment would be required with new responsi-
bilities whether attached to the Legislative Reference Service or not.
In any ever.., the type of service now provided by the Science Policy
Research Division is essential. Since this capability already exists
there would be no need for an OTA to duplicate it. Further, as noted
subsequently, the established practice of the Legislative Reference
Service (SPRD) in responding to the requests of any Committee of the
Congress may not be a procedure the OTA might deem advisable to follow.
Yet, the "on call" procedure certainly appears to be a most useful one
and will undoubtedly be continued by the Legislative. Reference Service.
Implicit in the, Report on Technical Information for Congress is
the cautionary theme that technology assessment not be viewed as a
simplistic process. There are endless ramifications. One which
should be of concern is the necessity for and extent to which management
considerations of technological projects will or should be emcompassed
in the concept of assessment. The management of a technological
application can make a vast difference in the resulting social benefits
and costs of a project. An article in the Washington Evening Star of
November 25, 1969, p.12, col. 1, illustrates this point. In connection
with an investigation by the National Transportation Safety Board on
"the carriage of large quantities of hazardous materials through populated
areas (where) supposedly effective safety controls do not work," the
Board is quoted:
Many of the failures of safety controls are attribut-
able to ineffective planning, design, and management







Management considerations also suggest the activities of the General
Accounting Office. While not normally thought of as a technology
assessment entity, the GAO performs occasional studies which are clearly
germane to technology assessment even though primarily directed to fiscal
and administrative aspects of technological projects. For example,, the
I
	 GAO made a Report to the Congress on the "Administration of Project
Mohole by the National Science Foundation" (April 23, 1968). The Annual
Report 1968 of the Comptroller General (of the U.S.) states:
Among the underlying factors which led the Congress to
discontinue funding Project Mohole (a project to pene-
trate the mantle of the earth) was the steady escalation
of the estimated cost and time to complete the project.
These estimates increased from $46.7 million to $127.1
million and from 5 to 81^ years. The report contains an
analysis of the reasons for these increases and points
out that under the approach followed, the Foundation
was not in a position to determine adequately that the
project objectives were worth the money and resources
that were necessary to attain them. Yet it was totally
committed to the project.
We suggested an alternative approach to be used by the
Foundation in future major research and development
projects involving totally new or exploratory concepts,
calling for the projects to be conducted in a number of
sequential phases. Each phase would represent a specific
limited agency commitment whereby it would determine the
feasibility of the project objectives, the means to attain
these objectives, and whether the objectives would be worth
the costs involved before a contractual commitment was made.
A recent report of the GAO was directed to an "Examination into
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Report states:  (p .3)
Recommendations or Suagestions
GAO is recommending that the Secretary of the
Interior require that the States, in establishing
priorities for the construction of waste treatment
facilities, and FWPCA, in approving grants for
such construction, give consideration to (1) the
benefits to be derived from the construction of
the facilities and (2) the actions taken, or
planned to be taken, b y other polluters of the
waterways.
MICA should consider utilizing systems
analysis techniques in the planning for and
implementation of water pollution control programs.
FWPCA should consider also the practicability of
providing, through its storage and retrieval of
data (STORET) system (see p. 96), data needed by
the States ins
-- determining their water pollution control
requirements,
--identifying alternatives available to solve
water pollution problems,
-- formulating water pollution control plans,
and
-- establishing implementation schedules and
priorities for the construction of waste
treatment facilities
Another report of the GAO relating to the operations of an
Agriculture Research Service of the Department of Agriculture illustrates
how GAO functions involve not only the mechanisms and processes of
assessment but also the potential for conflict-of-interest situations
to arise in the nqe of nrivate consultants.4
M
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While most GAO investigations relating to technology assessment pertain
to completed or existing programs, some are anticipatory in character
such as the special study made of some of the legal, competitive, con-
sumer service, and other probable implications of the sale of AEC
gaseous diffusion plants to private owners. A further example is the
classified evaluation made to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy of
the Nike X/Sentinel anti-ballistic missile system in terms of economy,
efficiency, and effectiveness.
The GAO has not developed a special capability for technology
assessment nor is its professional staff broadly representative of
professional skills in comparison, for example, with the Legislative
Reference Service. However, the GAO's long experience in the appraisal/
evaluative function, its movement toward enlarging its skill base so
as to take into account a broader- spectrum of social costs and benefits,
and its increasing emphasis on the systems approach to major public
projects are definitely compatible with a more comprehensive technology
assessment function. Even the existing fiscal and management analysis
capability of GAO would provide indispensable support to an OTA in
taking a comprehensive view of given applications.
Yet, however substantial the services now performed by the LRS
and the GAO in technology assessment, neither is organized presently to
perform the types of functions that a Congressional Component such as
that posited herein could perform. Neither is really a technology	 r.is
assessment manager in a comprehensive sense. The bolstering up of
z
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organizational entity be established. The question then becomes
whether there is promise of greater net benefit from the grafting of
the expanded technology assessment function onto one of the existing
organizations or by establishing a separate entity. The latter approach
may add somewhat to the complexity of the organizational structure, but
it would provide visibility for the assessment function which would not
likely emerge if such function is subsumed in the existing LRS or GAO.
Further, a new organizational entity would provide the conditions for
the unique tasks with which OTA would be charged. For example, it would
not be expected to serve a "mass of masters" as does the Legislative
Reference Service. To put the matter differently, if the Science Policy
Research Division were given the amplified assessment job, would it be
able to meet its "on call" obligations while at the same time performing
the information management tasks which will be required of the OTA?
No doubt the GAO could develop a_ comprehensive assessment capability,
but would not this effort inevitably be subordinated to traditional
GAO fiscal and management functions? What the Congress would seem to
need and the JSC/OTA would provide is both the management apparatus and
the "feel." of being in control of the situation. This latter element
of establishing confidence in our understanding and control of the
movement of technological development is perhaps the most significant
I
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A further massive allocation of assessment responsibility (which
will facilitate the performance of the JSC/OTA component) can be made
to the Executive Branch Departments, Administrations, and Programs which
are deeply involved with technological applications. One of the primary
tasks of the OTA will be to assure comprehensive total impact assessments
of given applications, as well as special purpose assessments for
particular social problems. The most logical loci for total impact
assessments are those agencies having primary authority over relevant
technological applications such as DOT in transportation technology.
Here is where the basic data relating to technological applications are,
or should be, assembled, analyzed, and reported. Apparently, DOT does
not yet have this data management system, but surely it is the locus for
total impact assessments of transportation projects, not the OTA. The
recent Report on "Transportation Information" to the Committee on
Appropriations, U.S. House of Representatives by the Secretary of
Transportation of May 1969 states:
Good decisions depend on careful analysis of
pertinent information, yet decisions involving
billions of dollars in transportation expenditures
are frequently based on inadequate information.
Without adequate information, the chances of costly
errors in these decisions are greatly increased. (p.vii)-
Present transportation information is characterized
by significant gaps, fragmentation and incompati-
bilities. It is not possible to examine the transporta-
tion system as a whole or in terms of its related
parts. The information problem; is so great that
considerable efforts will be required to bring about





The magnitude of expenditures involved in many
decisions on transportation items is so great
that even relatively small, savings - resulting from
the information program - will be large in absolute
terms. These savings will pay for the cost of the
information program many times over. (p.xi)
Measures of the performance of the transportation system
(in aspects besides safety) do not exist. There has
been recognition recently of the need for national social
indicators to parallel the long- established economic
indicators. Indicators of the performance of the
transportation system are a most important element in a
general set of social indicators (p.127)
The foregoing relates only to one major technological application
area. It demonstrates the truly staggering proportions of the information
management task. It is not only undesirable that the OTA assume this
entire task but would appear wholly infeasible for it to do so. Assess-
ments made by the Executive agencies might to some extent be discounted
by the ingrained skepticism of the Congress. But it would be the task of
the OTA to evaluate such assessments. The implementation of the
operation of the JSC/.OTA component may require the reorganization of
the information/assessment structure of the Executive agencies to a
far greater extent than is herein posited for the Congressional Assessment
Comionent. It would seem that these two assessment developments must
proceed concurrently and in coordination. Being highly interdependent,
the Congressional and Executive Components must closely mesh if the
overall assessment function is to be effective. There must be a high
degree of concurrence on what data is sought, means of identifying such
data if existing, and means of specifying data which needs to be
generated.
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A real, difficulty exists, however, in connection with making total
impact assessments of many perhaps most, technological applications,.
The formal authority for operations of those government agencies which
are the most likely candidates for a total impact assessment respohsi
bility re a particular application or applications is not necessarily
co-extensive with either the full scope of effects of the application
nor with the totality of aspects of the social problem context. As
has been pointed out, fragmentation of the assessment function is
basically a reflection of assessment entities with different authority,
objectives, and capabilities. Hence, each might reasonably ask why it
should accept responsibility for a total impact assessment. The Highway/
Motor Freight Carrier application and the Aircraft Noise Problem are
excellent examples of this division of formal authority and assessment
responsibility. This is not only evident as in the fragmentation of
authority in the Federal government but also as between the Federal,
State, and Local levels of authority. Since operational programs with
specified and usually narrow authority constitute a substantial segment
of the assessment entities in most technology assessment systems having
to do with major applications, the crucial problem of the OTA will be
to integrate the outputs of such entities into a Total Impact Assessment.
In view of the need for most of the assessment burden, particularly
with respect to governmentally sponsored technology, to be performed by
Executive Branch entities, will not the effective functioning of the
Congressional Technology Assessment Component depend upon a viable	 ;.






point is an article on "Presidential Staffing in the Sixties and
Seventies," by William D. Carey,, '5 who has long experience in Bureau
of the Budget affairs. After noting that "The modern President must
cope with shortened decision intervals and reaction times, and his
responses to domestic and foreign challenges must be immediate and
certain," Mr. Carey states flatly: "The Presidency is weak in policy
analysis" and follows up this discussion by pointing to a "second flaw"
in these terms:
In an age noted for advanced theory and technology
in organizing and applying information, the presidency
has no information system whatsoever. (p. 452)
lie further states:
It is hard to see how the presidency can grip the
policy dilemmas of the 70's with its present shaky
staff structure. There are limits to what can be
asked of the Bureau of the Budget, which is staffed
at the level it reached 20 years ago. The Council
of Economic Advisors limps along with barely a
score of professionals, while he Office of Science
and Technology with some 35 emeloyees cannot even
begin to reshape national science goals. These units,
together with the immediate White House staff, con-
stitute the troops (p. 457)
The NAS Report strongly emphasizes the need for an Executive Assess-
ment Component as 'a focal point of Executive Department Assessments and
as the locus of a comprehensive information system. One might question
whether Congress should rely solely upon this data source. The NAS
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data system, of its own. It would seem that the JSC/OTA component would
feel considerably more confident if it had control of its own overall
data source, although such system should make use of OST assessment data
instead of duplicating the data generation process. In any event, the
OTA, even if agreeing with the impacts identified by the Executive
Component re a given technological application, may have quite different
notions as to the social significance of such impacts, if measured
against social indicators reflecting a Congressional rather than an
Executive perspective. A total impact assessment capability in the OST,
for example, which would undertake to integrate the outputs of Executive
agencies and departments and private sector entities into total impact
assessments would surely lend tremendous assistance to the OTA. If
such capability is not established on a regularized basis then there
would seem to be no alternative for the OTA than to develop direct
communications links with all relevant Executive Departments and
Agencies.
B. Notion ' of " Independence" ' of ' the `Assessrfierit 'Function
Considerable attention has been given to an assumed relationship
between the credibility of the assessment process and the establishment
of appropriate conditions for detached, non-partisan performance of the
assessment function. This relationship has several facets and has been
expressed in different wars. In this presentation it would have specific
reference to the posited Office of Technology Assessment. The Report
of the National Academy of Engineering on Technology'Assessment is
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relevant to this matter:
Technology assessments should be produced in an
environment free from political influence or pre-
determined bias. It can be inferred from the pilot
studies, that the selection of a preferred course of
action, among alternative strategies derived from
the assessment, is not a suitable task for the tech-
nology assessment group. This function should remain
the prerogative of the legislator after he has been
provided with the bases for the application of his
judgment. (p.3)
Members of a technology assessment task force should
be chosen for their expertise but not as represent-
atives of affected parties or special interests. (p.4)
Experience shows that the task farce members possessing
a wide range of personal interests have been able to
focus on the public interest and to set aside the
biases of the organizations with which they are asso-
ciated. (p.4)
The NAS Report on Technology Assessment makes a number of observations
and suggestions with respect to this matter:
A central deficiency of existing mechanisms for
assessment is that they fail to separate promotion
or protection from evaluation, and thereby compro-
mise both their integrity and their credibility. To
overcome that deficiency, any new mechanism we
propose must be carefully insulated from direct
policy making powers and responsibilities.. (p. 80)
The Report also states that granting a power to "censor all technological
developments" could not be insulated from external political pressures
and further:
Entrusting such sweeping powers to a new assessment
entity would -rob it of any special claim to objectivity
and would render its judgments at least as suspect as




More directly to the point, the Report states:
hny new assessment entity we proposed therefore,
should be empowered to study and to recommend but
not to act. It must be able to evaluate but neither
to sponsor nor to prevent. We confront, however,
something of a paradox, for though we wish to assure
the neutrality of the new mechanism, we wish also to
assure that it be influential. The panel has no
thought of urging the creation of another organization
simply to add one more voice to the many that already
cry out for change. Thus, while it must itself seek
to be apolit-ical,, any new assessment mechanism must
be located close to the centers of power in the
political process; given the vast powers of the con-
tending interest that will surround it, any-organi-
zation less centrally situated would have no realistic
hope of materially influencing public policy. (p. 82)
The most we can hope for in creating a new mechanism
for technology assessment is to introduce a greater
degree of objectivity into the process and to infect
a body of criteria and assumptions that reflect a wider
set of interests and values than do the specialized
organizations currently engaged in fragmeltted'assessment
activities. (p. 83)
The thrust of the foregoing extracts from the NAS and NAE Reports
seems clear enough, although some of us might wish to substitute other
terms such as "non-partisan" for "neutral" and the concept of "adequacy
of assessment" for "objectivity of assessment."' Perhaps the critical
issue in addressing the proposed OTA function would be the reference to
the "paradox" confronted in attempting to design an apolitical mechanism
which will exert an appreciable degree of influence on the political
process. What we must do, it would seem, is to brush away- the "logical
impasse" and get on with the job of designing the most creditable
assessment function feasible for the express purpose of introducing
useful and reliable assessment data in the legislative processi. This
does not eliminate the inherent difficulty, but it does present a
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socially desirable task rather than a verbal "hang-up."
The GAO statutory scheme and practices are instructive in this
connection. The Comptroller General is an "agent of the Congress."
Among other things, the GAO has the authority and the responsibility
to "make such investigations of revenue, appropriations, or expenditures
as ordered by either House of Congress or any Committee having juris-
diction over Lach matters 6 The Comptroller General also has the
responsibility to report to the Congress, and if requested, to the
President, including "recommendations concerning the legislation he may
deem necessary to facilitate the prompt and accurate rendition and
settlement of accounts and concerning such other matters relating to
the receipt, disbursement, and application of public funds as he may
think advisable." 7 One might contend that such matters are more sus-
ceptible to consensual agreement, that is, less controversial, than
the subject matter of technological assessments, i.e.,,, 	 the identifi-
cation and evaluation of the full range of social values affected.
But certain investigations and reports of the GAO are clearly politically
sensitive. Nevertheless, it is my impression that the GAO generally
enjoys a reputation as a highly competent, reliable, and non-partisan
activity. The high respect status enjoyed by the GAO is perhaps largely
i
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General and his associates as to what types of investigations and
reports the GAO capability can be applied usefully as distinguished
from those which are so highly politicized as not to be amenable to analy-
tical treatment. It is also my impression that the National Transportation
Safety Board of the Executive Branch (DOT) is gradually building a
similar reputation for its impartial., deliberate process of accident
investigation.
Measured against the criteria offered by the NAS/NAE Reports
and the experience of the. General Accounting Office, how might one
evaluate the prospects for'the effective functioning of the Congressional
Assessment Component posited herein?
Would not the establishment of both a Joint Select Committee on
Technology and Society and an Office of Technology Assessment provide
an organizational focus of attention commensurate with the significance
of advancing technology to social problem areas? This would provide
an instrument for taking a total systems view of the ;interaction of
technology with relevant participants, institutions, and values.
The Office of Technology Assessment is envisioned as an assessment
support group directly responsible to the Congress through the Joint
Congressional Committee on Technology and Society. It would be an
entity separately identifiable from the staff of the Joint. Committee.
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it any substantial increment of assistance is to be provided the
Congress on technology assessment, it would seem abundantly clear
that an Office of Technology Assessment is needed in addition to.the
Joint Select Committee staff.
As noted, the NAS Report warns against the assumption of too
extensive a power over technological development and attempts to
clarify the conceptual conflict between the maintenance of a non-
partisan stance and the exercise of influence on decision-making. But
it would appear that at a certain point on the curve the two character-
istics can be mutually supportable. Once an entity has gained a .
reputation for usefulness and credibility, meaning that it is "'listened
to," it is also likely to be strengthened in its "independence" since
the preservation of conditions for a detached analysis is recognized
as serving the needs of all concerned. Again, it would appear that
the GAO has come close to approximating this status._ But the achievement
of this status is not simply a matter of organization. Other variables
are evident. First, the recognition by the Congress of the significance
of our technological resources and the disposition to assure their
effective utilization is essential. The OTA will have to be given
broad authority similar in scope to that of the GAO in order to establish
the importance of the OTA, function and to assure access to relevant
assessment data. Provision must be made for a staff which will provide
an assessment capability of the highest order. A strategy of implementation
must be designed which will gain the support of relevant, assessing
entities, including opportunity ";for general public participation in
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the assessment function. Ultimately, independence of operations, as
well as influence on decisions, will be achieved through performance
and through public confidence resulting from professionalization of
the assessment function.
One mark of independence is the degree of control over the
activities of an entity. Surely, the broader the range of controllers,
r
in the sense that an official or organization is in position to request
or demand the performance of certain tasks, the less control the entity
has. If all Congressmen or Even all Committees can call upon the OTA
for assessment tasks, then the independence of the OTA will clearly
become diluted. This does not mean that the OTA would operate entirely
outside the perimeter of Congressional needs. Such needs can be
expressed through the JSC, and periodic consultation can keep the OTA
currently apprised of Congressional needs. Nor would occasional
ad hoc requests of Congressional Committees through the JSC necessarily
be excluded.- But the point is that the Director of the OTA should have
the final determination of what assessment activities the OTA can use-	
r,
fully undertake. Consultation with JSC, as well as the requests for
assessment assistance which will inevitably be directed to the OTA,
will surely keep the latter finely attuned to the types of assessment
tasks which the Congress and other agencies consider of importance.
The Director will surely wish to be responsive to the Congress, but he
must be in position to make a determination on the basis of an informed
judgment as to what the more urgent existing and prospective needs are,
and he should have the statutory authority to do so. It would ,seem
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that a workable accommodation can be made. GAO experience is to some
degree relevant here. The Comptroller General is not obliged by statute
to respond to every individual Congressional request but apparently under-
takes to do so within the limits of GAO capability.
Two processes are always working in conjunction; the political,
partisan, adversarial system on the one hand and the non-partisan,
detached, professional, "respected source of information and analysis"
approach on the other. The first is nurtured by partisan interests,
by differences in attitudes toward priorities in social values, and by
uncertainties as to facts, predictions, and social consequences. The
second has its source of strength in the need for a trusted source of
information and in the need for the positing and explication of public
interest-oriented standards of judgment against which partisan claims
and demands can be tested and judged. In the assessment component
posited, the JSC provides the link to the political decision process
while the OTA provides the second, informational-analytical need.
The critical problem is to develop an OTA that is useful and
credible. The d z-F1,1 - of the OTA's abusing its powers appears remote. -
When an entit$,	influential, it simply means that it has an
appreciable effect on immediate or ultimate determinations of legal
rights and duties or of the allocation of resources, i.e., benefits
And costs. Hence_ those who are or may be affected will demand havine
AM
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reasonable assumption that the wide diversity of interests represented
in the Congress would effectively curb any undue exercise of influence
over political decisions by the OTA. Furthermore, whether obliged
by statute or not, the OTA would surely follow the information access
and dissemination policy as set forth in the Freedom of Information
Act. 8 This practice would not only be desirable in order for the OTA
to develop effective working relationships but for the purpose of
establishing its credibility with relevant governmental and private
sector entities. Such informational practices themselves are effective
constraints on arbitrary or thoughtless action.
C. Representation of Affected Partieipants in the Assessment Process
The concept of total impact assessment of technological applications
requires that the full spectrum of social interactions be explored by
the OTA. The staff of the OTA, representing all relevant professional
and disciplinary skills, will be in a position to identify most likely
impacts of an application. However, this internal process of anallz'is
may not in many instances provide a fully confident basis for assGn":":rlt
even though one purpose of the OTA in using assessment project contractors,
institutional grantees, advisory groups or special ad hoc commissions
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applications or of alternative technological projects and making,
determinations on the magnitude, intensity, and persistency of such
impacts. In addition to the identification of effects, however, there
is the further dimension, of assessment which will arise in connection
with some assessment tasks, i.e., the evaluation of the social desir-
ability or undesirability of such impacts, Certain segments of the
public may well view such impacts as benefits or threats in quite
different ways. Every application involves both benefits and costs,
but it does not follow that those segments of the public which share
the benefits necessarily coincide with those segments- of the public
which must bear the costs. It is often difficult to gain full
appreciation of these considerations without direct input from such
affected publics. Perhaps in a majority of situations those segments
of the public affected will have an organizational channel for expressing
their views which will come to the attention of the OTA. It is likely,
however, and especially with prospective applications, that_segements
of the public will be affected which are not represented by an 'organized
interest group or such group might not have perceived the implications
of the application. Hence, the question arises as to how the OTA is
to be assured of data on the full span of actual or probable social
consequences.
Some sort of modified public 'hearing procedure which would invite
relevant informational inputs during the assessment process need not
be incompatible with the concept of a professional, impartial, public
interest-oriented entity such as the OTA. A question does arise as
1
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to the extent such procedure should be formalized. Many entities
shy away from the judicialization of what are essentially assessment
determinations, feeling that the rigid procedures characterizing the
formal adjudicatory adversarial process deter rather than facilitate
access to relevant data. The view is sometimes expressed that the
adversary process is not suitable to the temperament of those whose
professional modes of inquiry tend toward the dispassionate search for
"truth" rather than to the extraction of the "facts" through partisan,
sometimes compulsory questioning. One must face the reality of those
assessment situations, however, where the assessment concerns existing
applications as contrasted with prospective projects. In these
situations, the assessment outcome will inevitably affect legal rights
and duties or the allocation of power, political or economic. This
situation invites controversy and demands to assert partisan claims. 	 r
It would not seem advisable for the OTA to be made subject to the
Administrative Procedure Acts or that it pursue nearing procedures winch
would require the imposition of similar processes. the Congress is_,
of course, specifically excluded from the definition of "agency"' pro-
vided in the APA. Further, the OTA would not have any "rule-making"
or "adjudicatory" .functions. In such hearings under the APA "A party
is entitled to present his case or defense by oral or documentary evidence,
to submit rebuttal evidence, and to conduct such gross-examination 'as
9
Administrative Procedure.Act, 80 ;tat. 381, 5 U.S.C. _S 551 et seg.
(Supp. IV, 1965-68). 	 ;'
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may be required for a full and true disclosure of the facts." 10
Possibly relevant as a "policy" to follow in OTA assessment processes,
however, is the provision in Section 556 (e) l that "When an agency
decision rests on official notice of a material fact not appearing in
the evidence in the record, a party is entitled, on timely request,
to an opportunity to show to the contrary." Yet, even the APA provides
in the same Section that "Any oral or documentary evidence may be
received, but the agency as a matter of policy shall provide for the
exclusion of irrelvant, immaterial, or unduly repetitious evidence.
.r
Probably something is to be learned from the procedures and practices
of the National Transportation Safety Board In connection with "public
hearings." The Board is an unusual type of assessment entity, the
Department of Transportation Act specifically stating that in the
exercise of its functions the Board is charged with a continuing review
of the safety situation with respect to all modes of transportation. 12
The Act further states that the Board in the exercise of its function
powers, and duties shall be "...independent of the Secretary and other
offices and officers of the Department." Section 1654 (b) of the Act
prescribes that the Board shall have responsibility for determining
cause or probable cause and reporting the facts, conditions, and
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circumstances of accidents investigated under authority transferred to
the Secretary of Transportation. Reports and recommendations of the
Board, as well as special studies, must be made public. The Board is
concerned with the fullest possible information. It is not concerned
with authoritative determinations of placing fault or assessing legal.
liability. Its findings are not admissible in court. In order to
obtain the most candid and uninhibited evidence feasible it is my
understanding that adversarial. procedures have been discouraged.
This operation raises an extremely interesting and critical question,
however, relating to the status of an independent, non-partisan entity
rendering assessment decisions which may ultimately have an influence
on the allocation of benefits and costs in the political process or in
the determination of rights and duties in the legal process. The NTSB
is responsible for establishing the probable cause of accidents and,
this finding is directly related to fault and liability. In accident
investigations the accident has occurred.. Liability for certain parties
and ,remedies for other potentially exist. The Board's recommendations
have been generally accepted; thus its assessments substantially influence
off;^ial decisions. Hence, various participants have a stake in its
findings. or may feel they do. This encourages a partisan approach which
may ;inhibit full disclosure of facts. In such circumstances, it should
be expected that partisan interests will demand to be heard.
Y
But the Board has also employed so-called "public hearings" to
evaluate means of solving problems. This is more or less equivalent to
the assessment of a prospective technological application rather than an
F
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existing one. On October 31, 1969, "The National Transportation Safety
Board... announced that more than 18 aviation organizations and govern
meet agencies (would) testify during the Safety Board's public hearing
beginning November 4th seeking to find ways and means to define and
correct t'Aie national aviation problem of midair collisions." 13 Rather
than following the somewhat formal proceedings of accident investigations,
I
the Board set forth the rules to be followed, namely that the hearings
would be a "seminar-type proceeding" and that "only Board Members will
question witnessess." This procedure would seem to fit more closely
Section 1654 (d) (2) of the Transportation Act providing for '"special
studies" than to Section 1654 (d) (4) of the Act pertaining to "accident
investigations." Yet even the initiation of the latter is limited to
those the Board "deems necessary and appropfiace."' But the point of
interest is that by structuring a'hearng in this manner the NTSB
provided
 a means of assembling relevatt data from affected participants
without being burdened by the legal apparatus of a formal hearing
Subsequently, of course, should a recommendation of the NTSB b y imple-
mented by the FAA, then a rule-making proceeding would be initiated
in accord with the APA. Does this suggest that the OTA should restrict
its "public hearings" to a similar essentially informal procedure and
avoid efforts to judicialize the information gathering function? This
approach would accommodate a modified adversarial system enabling
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relevant partisan interests to register their views on the technological
application involved. It would avoid most of the inquiries raised in
Question A6 in Part III, although it would not eliminate the situation
implicit in Question C7, i.e., data needed from a non-cooperative
private sector entity. The experience of the National Commission on
Product Safety14 should be reviewed in this connection. The Commission
was authorized to hold public hearings, to require private partici-
pants to submit reports and answer surveys, to administer oaths, and
"to require by subpeona the attendance and testimony of witnesses
and the production of all documentary evidence relating to the
execution of its duties." 15 Several public hearings have been con-
ducted by the Commission which apparently have been instrumental in
securing official or voluntary action on behalf of consumer protection.16
14
National. Product Safety Commission Act, Public Law 90-146,
90th Congress, lst Sess., 81 Stat., 467 (1967).
15
81 Stat. 468, S 3 (a).
16
National Commission on Product Safety, "Progress Report on
Results of Commission Work," November 18, 1969;
i	 .
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V - CONCLUDING COMMENT
The application of technological resources to national social
needs is a matter which should be viewed in the broadest perspective.
Technology assessment is a part of this general process. Technology
I	
in all its ramifications is definitely one of our major national
resources. It surely provides means of advancing many of our social
objectives speedily and effectively. We seem to be at a critical
decision point concerning the allocation of national resources to social
needs. This task should not be relegated solely to the partisan
political process, however important we consider the political/adversarial.
!	 system. Some of themost promising of our technological resources are
new concepts and techniques of information management and systematic
decision making. We are beginning to perceive some of the advantages
in systems and cybernetics approaches. Techniques of automatic data
processing, operations research, and simulation can be invaluable in
bringing relevant knowledge to bear on intricate policy decisions.
Converting the notion of technology assessment to an operational system
provides an unparalleled opportunity to apply these technological skills.
The need for synthesis of increasing specialization of knowledge and
function, the complex nature of our public problems, the absolute
necessity of bringing a problem-oriented approach to these matters if
we are to gain an effective degree of control over them would seem to
drive us inexorably to the use of these technological/analytical skills.
I am not referring to the mechanization of the legislative process. I
am speaking of bringing a higher degree of rationality to the legislative	 z
I
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process - a rationality that is tied to democratic values. Specifically,
I do not see such techniques as means of isolating the public decision
function from the public. Rather, the use of modern communications
technology and systems analysis provide the means by which public
participation can be assured to a degree never before possible. In sum,
the initiation of a more systematic and comprehensive technology
assessment function presents not only an opportunity to usefully apply
new technological skills but in so doing should encourage a broadened
spectrum of public participation.
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